REMEMBERANCE OF THINGS PAST AS

FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE N.A.L.

Dr. S. R. Valluri

The Former Director General of the National Aeronautical Laboratories does stock-taking, evaluates the progress and takes note of the requirements – Editor

On 17^th December, 2003, the world celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the Wright Brothers first flight. Since then momentous advances were made in aviation. What characterizes these developments is the will to succeed, and explore new horizons of knowledge to achieve historical milestones. India’s first efforts in aeronautics were started more than sixty years ago by Walchand Hirachand and the then Mysore government. The aircraft company started by them was taken over by the Indian government during the Second World War (circa, 1940) to function as a repair base for the Southeast Asia Command. Thus was born, what is now the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Sixty years is not a small period to take stock of its progress. For any body who has been associated over the years with aeronautics at policy levels, the question that frequently arises in one’s mind is the extent of commitment to obtain a measure of self reliance in this important field of high science and high technology.

Aircraft industry is characterized by long gestation periods, with development of appropriate technologies demanding a long term vision. It is the lack of a clear policy that recognised this fact, that has hurt the development and the growth of indigenous aircraft industry. Dr. Kota Harinarayana, now former LCA program director drew attention in a recent lecture to the “need for pro-active designing”. According to a press report he stated, “Quality parameters would have to be incorporated at the design stage of aircraft-building instead of attempting corrections at the testing and manufacturing levels”. The fact of the matter is that of quality parameters have to be incorporated at the design stage itself, forward technology development in anticipation of future requirements is essential. It was this that has been lacking in the growth of the Indian aircraft industry. The Light Combat Aircraft development program showed how serious the situation could become with out such vision.

Theodore Von Karman, the all time great of aeronautics said “Good decision comes from experience and experience comes from bad decisions?” Even a cursory look at the growth of our aircraft industry indicates that we did not pay adequate attention to obtaining self-reliance by building a strong research and technology base, and depended over the years more on licensed production. It would be instructive to recall our past acts of commission and omission, if only to learn from them.

It was around 1967 Vikram Sarabhai, the visionary space scientist, visited the Belur campus of the National Aeronautical Laboratories (NAL). Looking across the runway towards HAL, he expressed his ambition to put an Indian made satellite in the orbit with an Indian made launch vehicle, before the next generation. Indian made fighter aircraft would take to the skies. His ambition was subsequently achieved by Satish Dhawan his successor in the Department of Space, with APJ Kalam as the Project Director for the SLV 3 program. It is useful to note in this connection that in Space, R&D and the launch vehicle and satellite development were closely and vertically integrated and the Department was headed by scientists/technologists who are technically familiar with the field. This has not been the case in aeronautics till recently at policy levels.

In the mid fifties, under the leadership of the German designer Kurt Tank, India launched the development of the supersonic fighter aircraft HF24. Regrettably the government was unwilling to sanction Rs.5 crores (Rs.50,000,000/-) to Bristol Siddeley for the development of the after burner variant of the Orpheous 703 as its power plant. HF24 could not achieve its designed super sonic performance with out it. It was an error in policy judgement causing a serious set back to its development and for that matter, the future of developing a substantially self reliant aircraft industry. Against this background, the Air Force continued to buy outright or take up through HAL, licensed production of aircraft needed by them. Development of HF24 also under lined the importance of developing our own engines as an essential precursor for the aircraft development.

One of the results of the HF24 development program was the awareness that if we did not have a strong R&D base interacting with the industry, it would not be possible to obtain a reasonable degree self-reliance. This awareness resulted in the late 50’s in the creation of the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) under the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the National Aeronautical Laboratories (NAL) under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), as the R&D organisations to back up HAL. While the development of HF24 was going on under Kurt Tank, HAL took on the concurrent responsibility for the design, development and series production of the jet trainer HJT 16. V M Ghatage was the moving spirit behind the program and Raj Mahindra had the direct, day to day responsibility for the program. This was the first major attempt made by HAL to design and develop a jet aircraft on its own without any foreign assistance.

ADE during those days was mostly concerned with the development of hover craft, pilot less aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, simulators etc. It was only when the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program was taken up in early 80’s and the responsibility for developing the “Fly By Wire” (FBW) control system for the LCA was given to them, their interaction with HAL really started.

The first major task GTRE took up with a specific end objective was the development of the after burner for the Orpheous 703 engine for the HF24, after the government rejected the Bristol Siddeley proposal. GTRE was able to demonstrate on the test bed, the desired 20% increase in thrust in the reheat mode. It also took up concurrently the development of the various major subsystems such as the compressor, the combustion chamber and the turbine stage that go into making a 5000kg class flat rated gas turbine. This knowledge eventually helped GTRE in the prototype development of the experimental GTX 35 gas turbine.

The need for generating the crucial high speed wind tunnel data for the HF24 on our own, highlighted the importance of having such facilities within the country. Satish Dhawan then at IISc and VM Ghatage, then in HAL Design Bureau, were the driving forces for establishing the Wind Tunnel Center which became the core of NAL activities. Apparently, Homi J Bhabha, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a confidant of Prime Minister Nehru was instrumental in prevailing upon him to locate NAL in CSIR, a civilian organisation, hopefully to obtain better interaction with other countries. UNDP helped NAL with a one million dollar grant to build the infrastructure and start research activities, primarily intended to support the airframe development in HAL. NAL latter collaborated with Space in the development of their launch vehicle programs. It also took up as in house activity, forward looking basic and applied research and some technology development key to self-reliance. In propulsion it played a supporting role to GTRE.

By late 60’s HJT 16 was in series production but the future of any indigenous fighter aircraft development in the country was in a state of suspended animation. It was against this background and substantial dependence on licensed production, that Prime Minister Mrs.Gandhi appointed Mr.C. Subramanyam, former cabinet minister, as the chairman of the Aeronautics Committee to look into the situation. Its study group for R&D had clear instructions from the Chairman to bring out acts of omission and commission to take appropriate decisions.

A major problem looked into by this committee was to establish what went wrong when the after burner developed by GTRE was installed in the HF24. Detailed studies indicated that adequate attention was not paid in redesigning the aft end of HF24 to accommodate the after burner. The 20% increase in thrust demonstrated on the test bed was washed out due to the increase in the aft end drag.

One of the important recommendations of the Aeronautics Committee was the creation of the Aeronautics Research and Development Board (A R & D B) as the focal point for supporting forward looking R&D to support future aircraft development. Mr. Subramanyam took up the matter directly with Mrs. Gandhi. Its creation was considered essential for establishing a healthy indigenous aeronautical base. If enough attention was not paid to develop necessary technologies through forward looking R&D, aircraft development programs would be delayed or subject to avoidable constraints by other countries, as had happened in the HF24 program.

After its creation, AR&DB functioned only on an ad hoc basis, without any a long term R&D policy. Furthermore, the funds made available to it were inadequate considering the scope of its responsibilities. Shortly, after its creation in the 70s a proposal was made to then Scientific advisor to the minister of Defence and Chairman of AR&DB, that it should be the focal point for all project specific R&D funding in anticipation of future requirements. One of the DRDO laboratories objected. Integrated planning of R&D and centralised support for it remained a dream.

The Aeronautics Committee recommended the development of a fighter aircraft, STOL aircraft, and a helicopter. The helicopter program was launched with Raj Mahindra heading it. HAL continued to take up feasibility studies of the Air Staff Requirements (ASR) projected from time to time, with hope of launching a fighter aircraft development program also. Concurrently, considering its intrinsic potential, HAL tried to obtain Rolls Royce RB 199 as a power plant for HF24, to obtain supersonic performance. They could not get it. HF24 with RB199, would have upset plans of UK for offering Jaguar for license production to India. The Air Force continued to buy out right, or get aircraft required by them produced under license by HAL.

Development of STOL aircraft primarily to respond to civil requirements did not come through. HAL produced AVRO 748 and Dornier 228 under license. A proposal by Dornier to HAL for the joint development of a medium size commercial air craft did not get support. Subsequently, Dornier went into collaboration with Fairchild in the US. We missed an opportunity to penetrate international markets. Due to limited Indian market, and potential difficulty to penetrate international markets on its own, commercial aircraft development has not been a priority for HAL. In recent times, to control its destinies to some extent, NAL took on the task of developing the FRP two seat trainer aircraft, Hansa, and a 9 to 14 passenger multi role light transport aircraft (LTA). Hansa has been type certified for night flying also and a few of them produced in NAL for flying club use through DGCA. Its series production will have to establish its commercial viability. LTA has yet to fly. It would appear that its development as a successful commercial aircraft, demands considerable weight reduction calling for significant redesign of its structure. This may be expected to result in about a three year delay in its type certification and a cost over run of about Rs.75 to Rs.100 crores, apart from about RS.130.00 crores already spent on its development. These will necessarily reflect on its commercial viability.

Coordination among the aeronautical institutions in planning their R&D continued to be negligible. Till Krishna Das Nair came on the scene, corporate R&D work in HAL was not significant. Elsewhere in the world, corporate R&D plays a crucial role as an interface with other R&D and academic institutions, to absorb such knowledge and use it in the development of aircraft.

It would be interesting to note the American scene in this context. Faculty from nearby academic institutions are frequently used as consultants by the US aircraft industry. Some of the problems posed by the industry, become home assignments to the students. The more complex ones were frequently submitted to NASA or the US Air Force for project specific support. These frequently resulted in Ph.D theses, with the results eventually becoming inputs to the industry, thus closing the cycle of specific knowledge generation and its utilisation by the industry. For example, when the US Air Force desired to increase the turbine entry temperature to obtain higher operational efficiency, it supported several programs running into millions of dollars in academic and research institutions and the industry. When the cooled turbine blade technology was successfully developed, it closed all the ongoing programs.

Recognising the lack of progress for obtaining self reliance, Prime Minister Mrs.Gandhi, in 1976 constituted the Aero Space Group under the Chairmanship of the then S A to look into the matter. It was a high level committee which deliberated for about two years and could not come to any conclusions that would further the cause of self reliance. There was an inherent conflict in the perceptions of the scientists and the civil servants in the committee. The scientists argued that it would be impossible to obtain any self reliance with out close coordination between the industry and the R&D, and that they should be integrated along the lines of Space, to evolve appropriate policies, the new agency as in Space, something the civil servants were not willing to accept. After extended discussions, they recognised the need for integration and reluctantly agreed for achieving it through “evolution”. But they were not willing to set a dead line for it. It became clear that it would be easy to create a new department of the Government than restructure existing ones.

Raja Ramanna took over as the SA around 1978. He felt that obtaining some self reliance was still not a lost cause, and that it could perhaps be achieved through a fighter aircraft development program, If the Air Force would support it. It was indicated to the then Air Chief, that if the Air Force did not want an indigenously developed aircraft, the relevant research laboratories might well diversify and take up other activities. However, if the Air Force believed in obtaining a measure of self reliance, it was the time to support an indigenous fighter aircraft development program, as the ability of the Air Force to protect our skies would not be compromised, what with the MIG 21 aircraft under licensed production and with agreement for getting the Jaguar in the horizon. The Air Chief agreed to support. The aeronautical community owes much to Air Chief Marshal Latif for his support. The first and perhaps the most important hurdle was crossed and a major break through was obtained.

The SA wisely suggested that some European aircraft industries should be retained as consultants to come up with their own feasibility studies of the Air Staff target. Simultaneously an integrated team was constituted from the Industry, R&D and the academic insitution, drawing people from the HAL Design Bureau and the R&D and academic institutions. It was the first time that such an integrated team started functioning. Thus was born the Light Combat Aircraft development program, formally sanctioned by the government in July 1983.

The results of these studies were revealing. It turned out that our designers were in no way inferior in conceptual designs, but we did not have some of the crucial technologies needed to develop the LCA on our own. The carbon fibre composites (CFC) for the airframe and the “Fly By Wire” (FBW) control systems, with relaxed static stability were found to be crucial for the LCA development. CFC technology development received support over the years. It did not therefore pose serious problems. FBW technology was a different matter. Attention was not paid for its development earlier and neither for the studies of the problems posed by relaxed static stability design.

BAE, converted a Jaguar aircraft to a flying test bed to study relaxed static stability problems. It was proposed at an HAL Board of Directors meeting, that an HF 24 should similarly be converted into a flying test bed to study the same problem, as this technology would be essential to respond to any future needs of the Air Force. It was rejected by a civil servant from the Defense Ministry on the Board, stating that if the government did not sanction an aircraft development program, it would result in infructuous expenditure. Nevertheless a project was jointly proposed by HAL and NAL, well before the LCA development itself was launched. It did not receive support.

LCA program was formally approved by the government in July 1983. The principal architect for the conceptual design of LCA was Raj Mahindra. ADE was given the responsibility for the FBW technology development by ADA. They gave a back to back contract to a US company for its development. GE 404 was chosen as the power plant. The Cauvery engine currently under development in GTRE was not even on the drawing boards. The GTX engine under development by them at that time was found unsuitable to achieve the ASR’s of LCA. NAL closely interacted with HAL in the airframe development of the LCA, taking major responsibility for its carbon fibre composite structural components, including the wing center box. This helped to reduce the weight of the airframe significantly.

Following the sanction of the LCA program, the Aeronautical Development Agency was brought into existence, with the SA as the Chairman of its Governing Body. A Director General was appointed as its Chief Executive to look after its day to day responsibilities. At that time it was explicitly understood that it would be a lean organisation, which can be closed at any time. It was to be primarily a funding, managing and monitoring agency, with the primary responsibility for the design and development of the LCA resting with HAL, with the other institutions working on a sub contractor mode under the auspices of ADA, thus delineating clear responsibilities. Subsequently, ADA seems to have taken a life of its own, with direct involvement in the development of the LCA.

The then SA, Chairman of the governing body of ADA was informed several times, that there would be serious delays if Mahindra was not with the program, as he was the only person then, who had a hands on experience in designing a jet air craft. Nevertheless, end of May 1985, SA desired that he should be eased out, something which he latter denied having said. If the chief executive of ADA, did not command the confidence of the Chairman in such matters, it was considered to be inappropriate for him to continue. Accordingly, they both tendered their resignations in June 1985. These were made effective November 1985. The aeronautical community owes much to Mahindra, a self effacing person, who did so much by his contributions for obtaining self reliance in aeronautics in the country.

Before the resignations became effective, a presentation was made in July 1985, on the status of the LCA development to the general body of ADA, presided by the Defense Minister. It received unanimous support about the progress already made by then. The minister was also informed that it was essential to live up to the time schedules, as such air craft were expected to meet perceived threat scenarios at a certain future time. He was informed that to comply with this requirement, we had to obtain certain technologies such as FBW control systems from abroad, with our engineers working side by side with our contractors. If the program is delayed too long, the threat scenarios may well change, making LCA irrelevant to respond to the Air Force needs. The Minister was also informed that indigenous engine development by GTRE was essential even if did not meet the time schedules of the LCA to avoid facing a similar situation again.

Following these developments, Kota Hari Narayana became the Head of the LCA program early 1986. He had a good feeling for design. But being the first time that he handled such a major responsibility, he had to learn much on the job about the actual design of LCA, an advanced technology aircraft. Given the circumstances under which he took over the responsibility, he did a commendable job for the task entrusted to him. LCA flew first time in January 2001.

Flight testing is demanding and time consuming. As the flight tests required for full type certification have yet to be completed, it is inevitable that there will be further delays with the eventual cost of development of the LCA going up even more.

Considerable progress has been made in the LCA development in spite of delays and several hurdles. Years of experience in Indian aeronautics and how it is handled in Space suggests, that we should closely coordinate the R&D and the industry, preferably along the lines of Space Department. Otherwise, we will be condemned to repeat the same mistakes. Even if the Air Force does not accept the LCA, it is essential that its progress up to the type certification stage must be gone through, if only to learn how to design and develop such aircraft in future.

Back